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COMMENTS
the procuring spouse from pleading the invalidity of the Mexican decree,
especially where all interested parties have acted in reliance on that
decree.
Where both spouses have personally appeared in the Mexican action,
they certainly had the opportunity at that time to litigate the question
of jurisdiction.
Another method of treating Mexican divorces would be to give
them the same effect in the United States that they would have in Mexican
state or federal courts.' As has been indicated before, lax practices
of the state courts are being eliminated. This would mean that American
courts would have to delve into Mexican law to determine the effect of
the Mexican divorce according to the applicable Mexican law. Although
they have shown, with few exceptions, an extreme reluctance to do so,
our courts could then give meaning to the doctrine of comity with a
freer judicial conscience.
And finally, should there be a "moral difference between a person
in moderate circumstances securing a Mexican decree and a more affluent
person securing a Nevada divorce .... It would disregard the fact that in
our society Mexican and Nevada divorces both pose as being more or




In general the courts experience difficulty in determining what is
total disability within the meaning of insurance disability clauses; this is
due in part to variations in the language of the disability provisions, which
in many instances are circumscribed and restricted by qualifying words
and phrases, and in part to the variant factors in the individual situations
to which the courts are asked to apply disability provisions.
It has long been the rule that the total disability contemplated
by an accident policy, or a life insurance policy containing a disability
clause,' does not mean a state of absolute helplessness,2 but rather an
106. Vieira, Efectos de las sentencias de divorcio el los paises ntranieros, 3 RIVIsT
Dr LA FACULTAD DE DERECnO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES 557, 569 (Uraguay 1953) (Suggest-
ing that recognition be granted only to divorce decrees rendered by courts competent"according to international principles").
107. Petition of R_ ., 56 F. Supp. 969, 971 (D.C. Mass. 1944).
I. A typical disability clause reads: "Benefits will, be paid when insured has be-
come totally disabled as the result of bodily injury or disease occuring after the issuance
of this agreement, so as to he prevented from engaging in any business or occupation
and performing any work for compensation, gain or profit."
2. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bird, 152 Fla. 532, 12 So.2d 454 (1943); Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y of U.S. v. McKeithan, 160 Fla. 486, 160 So. 883 (1935); Ayers v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 219 La. 945, 54 So.2d 409 (1951); Carver v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 191 Va. 265, 60 S.E.2d 865 (1950).
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inability to do all the substantial and material acts necessary to the
pursuit of the insured's work or business? This well settled rule rests
on sound logic, for it is the purpose of these policies to indemnify the
insured against disability and the subsequent loss of wages. With this
in mind, courts have liberally construed these policies toward that end.
4
Since a strict construction of the total and permanent disability
clause would require an absolute state of complete paralysis ending only
in certain death, it becomes apparent that neither party intended such a
meaning. The problem, however, arises in selecting that middle ground-
that line beyond which total disability ceases and partial disability appears;
or, to what extent must an insured be disabled in order to come within
the total and permanent disability clause, keeping in mind uppermost
and always, what the intention of the parties was at the time of the
creation of the contract. To select this ground, or line, courts will often
look to other provisions in the contract.
PARTIAL ABILITY TO WORK
A common defense available to the insurance company lies in the
insured's partial ability to work. This defense, however, is greatly
tempered by almost universal jurisdictional unanimity that the insured
must not only be physically equipped but also properly educated and
of similar social station before his partial ability to work can mature into
"work."'  A further qualification of this defense is that the insured, though
able to partially perform, must necessarily be able to do the essentia8
acts necessary to the exercise of his profession or of any profession or
vocation to which he may reasonably be suited by reason of education,
income, and social position. Note, however, that mere inability at
infrequent intervals to perform some of the acts required in the conduct
of business or occupation, is not total disability within the meaning of
the policy.7
3. Clarkson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1933); Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Picard, 155 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1946); Mutual Benefit Health
and Ace. Ass'n v. Murphy, 193 S.W.2d 305 (Ark. 1946); New York Life Ins. Co v.
Bird, note 2, supra.
4. Morgan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 157 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1946).
5. Shavarsh Chuckhian v. Met Life Ins. Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d.760, 230 P.2d
381 (1951); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Huchins, 127 Fla. 540, 173 So 696
(1937); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of U.S.v. Wiggins, 115 Fla. 136, 155 So. 327 (1934);
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 85 Ga. App. 659, 69 SE.2d 905 (1952); Continental
Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 314 Ky. 53, 234 S.W.2d 190 (1950); Huffman v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y of U.S., 192 Tenn. 476, 241 S.W.2d 536 (1951).
6. Shavarsh Chuckhian v. Met. Life Ins. Co., note 5, uPra; New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Huchins, note 5 supra.
7. Clarkson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1933).
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THE HOUSE CONFINEMENT CLAUSE
A further condition set up by the insurer, the compliance with
which is a necessary incident before disability can be termed total, is
the house confinement clause.8 Naturally, this clause applies only in
sickness claims, and has no application to accident cases. As in the total
and permanent disability clause, courts construe the confinement clause
liberally in the insured's favor,9 and rightly so, for an opposite construction
would require absolute confinement to the house; obviously, such confine-
ment cannot always lend itself to a speedy or desired recovery, for in
the treatment of some ills, fresh air, sunshine, and slight exercise are
necessary elements.'0  The weight of authority indicates that courts treat
house confinement clauses as mere evidence that there is total disability
and not as a condition precedent to the insured's eligibility to collect
within the total disability clause." The language in Rice v. American
Protective Health and Acc. Co.,' 2 wherein the court speaks of substantial
confinement as meeting the terms of the clause reflects this view and it
is by far the prevailing view in the various states,'8
REGULAR ATTENDANCE BY PHYSICIAN
Closely akin to the house confinement clause, is the condition that
an insured must have the attendance of a physician,' 4 regularly, in order
to come within the total and permanent disability clause. As in the house
confinement clauses, courts are in almost unanimous agreement that this
clause be treated as evidentiary and not as a condition precedent that
requires strict compliance.' Such a construction lends itself favorably
towards achieving the purpose for which the clause was intended; namely,
to guard against fraudulent claims.' 6 Any other construction would serve
no useful purpose and would merely enforce an idle formality to the
detriment of the insured.'7 However, in Mutual Ben. Health & Ace.
Ass'n v. Cohen,'8 the court held the terms were clear and unambiguous
8. A typical clause reads: "A disability to constitute claim for indemnity for
sickness only, shall be continuous, complete and total, requiring absolute necessary con-
finement to the house."
9. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Bocock, 266 P.2d 1082 (Ariz. 1954); Schoeman v.
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co. of Mass., 239 Iowa 664, 32 N.W.2d 212 (1951); Rice v.
American Protective Health and Acc. Co., 157 Neb. 256, 59 N.W.2d 378 (1953).
10. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Bocock, note 9, supra.
11. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Bocock, Note 9, supra.
12. 157 Neb. 256, 59 N.W.2d 378 (1953).
13. But see, Mutual Benefit Health and Acc. Ass'n v. Cohen, 194 F.2d 232 (8th
Cir. 1952), where the court held the clause clear, unambiguous and not in contravention
of public policy as attempting to prescribe a rule of evidence. In this case, strict com-
pliance with the clause was a prerequisite to recovery.
14. A typical clause reads: "The insured might receive benefits if continuously un-
der the professional care and regular attendance, at least once a week, beginning with
the first treatment, of a licensed physician or surgeon."
15. World Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 193 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. 1946).
16. Ottey v. National Cas. Co., 192 Misc. 902, 81 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1948).
17. World Ins. Co. v. McKenzie, 212 Misc. 809, 55 So.2d 462 (1951).
18. 194 F.2d 232 (8 Cii. 1952).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
and treated the clause as a condition precedent requiring strict compliance
as a prerequisite to recovery.1
OTUER INCOME
The purpose of disability insurance is to provide necessities, not income.
Most insurers only allow an amount of insurance based on a percentage
of an insured's net income-usually 50%. It is common for an insurer
to pro-rate the benefits it will pay based on the amount the insured
receives from other accident and health policies he holds. The problem
arises as to whether insured may receive benefit payments if he is disabled
but receives income from other sources, such as investments or sick leave
pay. Courts favor insured here, if in fact, insured is disabled. 2  But, if
insured is receiving his full salary (as distinguished from sick pay), it is
almost universally held he is not totally and permanently disabled within
the meaning of the contract,2 1 unless insured is in fact the owner of the
company that is paying him.
SURCERY
Often times, the disability arising out of certain types of injuries
or sicknesses can be corrected by surgery. To guarantee a compliance in
this area, an insurer may insert a clause to that effect, thus making
corrective surgery a condition precedent, the compliance with which
is a necessary incident to recovery.22  The problem, however, exists in
those cases wherein the policy is silent as to surgery. Most states now
hold that if the policy does not expressly so provide, the insured does not
have to submit to surgery.23 The rationale for this view is aptly stated
in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v, Katz:24 "The insured is under no
obligation, contractual or otherwise to so submit and thereby incur expense
and risk of his life so that insurer might be relieved of its liability to
him." Note, however, that where an insured voluntarily undergoes
corrective surgery and a portion of the disabled limb or part is removed
and normal function of the part or limb is restored with an artificial aid
(as in a removal of defective lens in eyes for cataract condition and there-
after 'with glasses' insured gets a job and has full use of sight) then
notwithstanding the fact that the insured has absolutely no use of the
limb or part. without the arificial aid the insured cannot recover 25-the
rationale being that the coverage contracted for was limited to loss of
19. But see, DeSoto Life Ins. Co. v. Barham, 210 Ark. 467, 196 S.W.2d 592 (1946),
where insurer was deemed to have waived this condition by making payments under the
policy.
20. Denton v. Prudential Ins. Co., 100 Colo. 293, 67 P.2d 77 (1937).
21. Guardian Life v. Kortz, 109 Colo. 330, 125 P.2d 640 (1942).
22. interestingly enough, this clause, if present in the contract, is always treated
as a condition precedent, as contrasted to the other clauses discussed above.
23. Stewart v. Home Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 834 (Colo. 1939).
24. 102 Colo. 587, 81 P.2d 775 (1938).
25. See note 23 supra.
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function of the part or limb and not loss of the physical portion of
the part or limb. Contrast this with the holding in Continental Cas. Co.
v. Baros2 where it was held the insured could not recover for loss of
his hand where the contract called for indemnification for loss of hand
at or above the wrist. In the Baros case, the court applied the converse
rationale-that is, indemnification for loss of the part rather than the
function of the part.
ARTIFICIAL CORRECTION
Closely related to the problem of when an insured must undergo
surgery to correct his disability, is the problem of corrected disability by
artificial means. May an insured still receive benefits for a lost hand that
has been replaced by a hook? It has been held that he can, notwith-
standing the fact he can now perform some acts with the hook.
27
Curiously enough, however, eyes restored to normal vision by glasses are
not within the range of this view.28 Apparently, the question turns on
whether or not the artificial device is normally considered a usual part
of the person's habiliment. An interesting question arises in an injury
to an artificial limb-could an insured recover for such an injury? A case
not precisely on all fours would seem to indicate no recovery, 9 based
on the theory that such an injury is not a personal or bodily injury, but
rather a property injury, and thus not within the protection of "bodily
injury" policies.
In most cases, compliance with or fulfillment of the above mentioned
factors affecting total and/or permanent disability is not an either-or
proposition. That is, mere fulfillment of one or more of the factors
does not necessarily lead to total disability. In some cases, all the con-
ditions must be met, while in others, a case will succeed or fail on the
fulfillment of just one factor.
From an observation of the cases, a trend in favor of the insured
is readily discernible. Through the years, the attempts of insurers to
limit their liability or define total disability have met with judicial hostility.
This hostility has manifested itself either under the guise of public policy,
or as a defense against the insurer's attempts to prescribe rules of evidence.
Thus, have the courts been able to exercise much discretion, even to
the extent of promoting a policy, in a field which is technically termed
"contract".
Charles S. Salem, Jr.
26. Continental Casualty Co. v. Barvs, 72 Pla, 17, 72 So. 278 (1916), where all
that remained of insured's hand was a small unusable stub.
27. Mark Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 286 I11. 620, 122 N.W.2d 413 (1919).
28. Stewart v. Home Life Ins. Co., note 23 supra.
29. Trachtenberg v. Home Indem. Co., 204 Misc. 644, 121 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1953),
where the insured's denture was in insured's shirt pocket when an auto accident resulted
in injury to the insured and resulted in breaking of the denture, it was held not to be
a bodily injury.
